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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
         This appeal offers the en banc court the opportunity to 
attempt to clarify the quantum and nature of evidence that will 
permit a jury to find that an employer engaged in impermissible 
employment discrimination.  Although we believe that several of 
our opinions in recent years accurately and adequately set forth 
the applicable legal principles, the decision of the district 
court and that of a panel of this court, now withdrawn, require 
us to return to the central issue presented here. 
                                I. 
         Barbara Sheridan, a former employee of E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. (DuPont), filed this action under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq., charging 
DuPont and her former supervisor, Jacques Amblard, with several 
claims of sex discrimination and retaliation.  Sheridan, who had 
been an employee of the Hotel du Pont since 1979 and was at the 
time her employment ceased one of the Head Captains of the 
hotel's Green Room, asserted that DuPont discriminated against 
her on the basis of her sex when it failed to promote her to 
Manager of Restaurants in 1991 (Count I), retaliated against her 
for complaining about sex discrimination by putting her on 
probation and taking various disciplinary actions against her 
(Count II), and created intolerable working conditions, 
culminating in her removal from a supervisory position, which 
resulted in her constructive discharge (Count III). 
          After discovery, the defendants moved for summary 
judgment which the district court denied.  The court held that 
Sheridan had presented a prima facie case of discrimination and 
sufficient evidence to permit a factfinder to believe that 
DuPont's reasons for not promoting her, i.e., that she was not 
qualified for the position of Manager of Restaurants and that she 
had not applied for the position, were pretexts for 
discrimination.  App. at 57.  The court further held that 
Sheridan had presented adequate evidence to survive summary 
judgment on her retaliation claim and to enable a factfinder to 
reasonably believe that her supervisors had intentionally 
fabricated evidence of poor job performance in order to remove 
her from her position as Head Captain and offer her less 
desirable, dead-end jobs.  App. at 68.  The court concluded that 
"[i]f plaintiff's version of the facts were accepted by a trier 
of fact, it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude 
that resignation was plaintiff's only option."  Id. 
         Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial. The conduct 
that was the subject of Sheridan's claims straddled the period 
before and after November 21, 1991, the date of the enactment of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991), which granted a right to a jury trial on Title VII 
intentional discrimination claims for which compensatory or 
punitive damages are sought, id. § 1977A(c), 105 Stat. at 1073 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)).  The district court ruled 
that the jury would serve as the finder of fact for Sheridan's 
claims that were based on conduct that occurred after that date, 
but that the jury would serve only in an advisory capacity for 
claims based on events that occurred before that date.  This 
meant that the jury's verdicts on Count I (failure to promote) 
and the alleged retaliatory acts in Count II that occurred before 
November 21, 1991 were to be advisory, while the jury was to be 
the finder of fact for the remaining alleged acts of retaliation 
and with respect to Count III, Sheridan's claim of constructive 
discharge. 
         The trial occupied six days.  During the trial, the 
district court dismissed the claims against Amblard on the ground 
that an employee cannot be sued under Title VII.   
         After deliberating, the jury returned special 
interrogatories.  With respect to the promotion claim, the jury 
found that Sheridan was not qualified for the job of Manager of 
Restaurants and therefore found against her on her claim of 
discriminatory failure to promote.  With respect to retaliation, 
the jury found that DuPont had not retaliated against Sheridan 
for complaining of sex discrimination.  In contrast, the jury did 
find in Sheridan's favor on her claim of constructive discharge. 
It awarded her $17,500 in compensatory damages, over and above 
lost wages, but found that DuPont's actions were not taken "with 
malice or reckless indifference" to her rights, App. at 33, thus 
precluding Sheridan from receiving punitive damages.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a (b) (1).  Finally, the jury found that Sheridan 
had failed to mitigate her damages by $33,000, that amount to be 
deducted from the total amount of lost wages owed.  Because the 
court calculated Sheridan's lost wages to be $51,072, it awarded 
her $18,072, in addition to six months of front pay totalling 
$12,768.  The district court adopted as its own the jury's 
findings with respect to the conduct alleged in Counts I and II 
that took place before November 21, 1991.  
         Both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law or 
in the alternative for a new trial.  The district court granted 
judgment in DuPont's favor.  The court recognized that DuPont had 
proffered as one of the principal reasons for the disciplinary 
actions it had taken against Sheridan her alleged unauthorized 
"comping," i.e., giving away complimentary food and drinks in 
violation of the hotel's policy that they should be registered, 
and Sheridan offered evidence to the contrary, indeed, evidence 
that she was elsewhere on some of the days that DuPont claimed 
she was engaged in "comping" at the hotel. 
         In overturning the jury's verdict on the constructive 
discharge claim in favor of Sheridan, the court stated that even 
if the jury could have reasonably rejected the legitimacy of 
DuPont's investigation of Sheridan's alleged "comping," and thus 
its reasons for discharging her, "the Court is still left 
searching the record for evidence that gender played a 
determinative role in defendant's conduct. . . .  The Court . . . 
has failed to locate sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could infer such a finding."  Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
and Co., No. 93-46 (D. Del. July 14, 1994) at 9.  The court 
ruled that the evidence Sheridan presented which arguably related 
to her gender, such as the facts that no woman had ever held the 
position of Manager of Restaurants, that a man replaced Sheridan 
as Head Captain of the Green Room morning shift, that Amblard had 
told Sheridan he would watch her like a "hawk" and a "dog," and 
Amblard's actions in ignoring her and speaking instead to one of 
her male supervisors if one was present, was even in totality 
insufficient to support a reasonable inference that gender was a 
motivating factor in DuPont's actions.  Id. at 9-10.  
         The court stated that "[i]n order to demonstrate that 
gender was a motivating factor, plaintiff would have to point to 
some evidence that was the motive of those in the decision making 
process.  No such evidence exists in the record."  Id.  
at 11-12.  The district court accordingly granted DuPont's motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, and ruled conditionally, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c), that if the judgment were 
reversed on appeal, DuPont would be entitled to a new trial 
"because the jury's verdict is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence."  Id. at 12 n.11.  Sheridan appealed.  
         A panel of this court heard argument on May 4, 1995 and 
issued an opinion that reversed the district court's order 
granting judgment as a matter of law for DuPont on Sheridan's 
constructive discharge claim but was divided as to the 
alternative grant of a new trial, with two judges voting to 
affirm the grant of a new trial and the third voting to remand 
the issue whether a new trial was warranted for reconsideration 
by the district court, using the correct legal principles.  SeeSheridan v. 
DuPont, No. 94-7509 (Jan. 31, 1996), vacated, 74 F.3d 
1439 (3d Cir. 1996).  The majority and dissenting opinions 
differed in particular in their interpretation of the effect of 
the Supreme Court's opinion in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 
509 U.S. 502 (1993), on the inferences that the finder of fact 
may draw from its disbelief of the employer's proffered 
justification for the disciplinary employment action taken 
against Sheridan and the amount and type of evidence needed to 
sustain a jury verdict.          
         Both DuPont and Sheridan petitioned for rehearing and 
the court voted to hear the appeal en banc.  As required by our 
Internal Operating Procedures, the opinion of the panel issued  
January 31, 1996 was withdrawn and the court held the en banc 
argument on May 14, 1996.  
                             II.   
                           DISCUSSION 
                               A. 
                          Legal Issues 
         The parties disagree both as to the applicable law and 
the weight of the evidence.  DuPont argues that the district 
court's decision in its favor should have been affirmed in all 
respects.  It apparently recognizes that the district court's 
finding that Sheridan had not carried her burden of proving that 
DuPont's decisions were based on gender discrimination was not 
consistent with this court's prior decisions.  Thus, DuPont 
challenges and requests that we reconsider our prior decisions 
with respect to the "recurring problem of the shifting burdens" 
in employment discrimination cases, arguing that our decisions do 
not fully incorporate the teaching of the Supreme Court in Hicks.  
It singles out in particular the "underlying decision of the 
Court in [Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994)]."  
DuPont's Petition for Rehearing at 5. 
          Sheridan for her part argues that we have correctly 
interpreted Hicks in our post-Hicks decisions with respect to the 
evidence that would permit a plaintiff claiming employment 
discrimination to prevail, and cites, inter alia, Fuentes, 32 
F.3d 759; Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2611 (1995); Waldron v. SL Industries, 56 
F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995); and Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining 
Corporation, 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995). 
         We thus turn, this time en banc, to reexamine what 
DuPont calls "this continuing and perplexing problem of 
interpreting the shifting burden of Hicks."  
         By the time Hicks reached the Supreme Court, the 
required components of a plaintiff's prima facie case of 
employment discrimination had been established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & 
n.6 (1981), as had been the requirement that the employer was 
obliged to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse 
employment action, see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.  Also established was the requirement 
that the burden of persuasion remained at all times with the 
plaintiff.  See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.  
Still open, however, and the subject of considerable dispute, was 
the effect of the decision by the trier of fact that the reasons 
given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse 
employment action.  As the Court noted in Hicks, there were cases 
in the courts of appeals that held that a finding of pretext does 
not mandate a finding of illegal discrimination, see, e.g., EEOC 
v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992); Galbraith 
v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 945 (1992), and others that held that a 
finding of illegal discrimination was mandated on a finding of 
pretext, see, e.g., Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 970 F.2d 
487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992), reversed, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); King 
v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C.Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Wheeling 
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984). 
         In Hicks, a case in which the plaintiff had brought a 
Title VII action alleging that he was demoted and discharged 
because of his race, the court of appeals had concluded that 
"[o]nce plaintiff proved all of [the employer's] proffered 
reasons for the adverse employment actions to be pretextual, 
plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  970 F.2d 
at 492.  It was this holding that was reversed by the Supreme 
Court, which held that judgment for the plaintiff is not 
compelled by the disbelief of the employer's reasons.  509 U.S. 
at 511.  On the other hand, the Court also explicitly stated that 
a finding that the reasons proffered are pretextual permits the 
factfinder to draw the inference that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff.  Id. 
         In deciding the "ultimate question" of whether the 
employer unlawfully discriminated, the Court stated in the 
following oft-quoted passage that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief 
of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if 
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to 
show intentional discrimination."  Id.  The Court explained that 
"rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the 
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional 
discrimination," and continued:  "the Court of Appeals was 
correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, '[n]o additional 
proof of discrimination is required.'"  Id. (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Hicks, 970 F.2d at 493).   
         Reading these statements in the context of the Court's 
opinion, we have understood Hicks to hold that the elements of 
the prima facie case and disbelief of the defendant's proffered 
reasons are the threshold findings, beyond which the jury is 
permitted, but not required, to draw an inference leading it to  
conclude that there was intentional discrimination.  Accordingly, 
in Fuentes we explained that "the factfinder may infer from the 
combination of the plaintiff's prima facie case and its own 
rejection of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons 
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff 
and was merely trying to conceal its illegal act with the 
articulated reasons."  32 F.3d at 764.  It followed that a 
plaintiff may survive summary judgment (or in this case judgment 
as a matter of law) if the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence 
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's 
proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the challenged 
employment action.  Id. ("[T]o defeat summary judgment when the 
defendant answers the plaintiff's prima facie case with 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its action, the 
plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve 
the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe 
that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not 
a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.").  
         Although we ultimately decided in Fuentes that the 
plaintiff had failed to submit evidence which cast sufficient 
doubt on his employer's proffered reasons for failure to place 
him in the position that he sought, application of the same 
approach in some later cases led us to hold that the plaintiff 
had satisfied his or her burden and raised an issue to be decided 
by the trier of fact.  Thus, in Sempier we reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment for the employer in an Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) action because Sempier, 
an executive at an insurance brokerage and consulting firm, had 
presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact 
as to whether the company's claim that he was forced to retire 
for poor performance was a pretext for age discrimination.  45 
F.3d at 732-33. 
         Shortly thereafter, in Waldron, another ADEA case, we 
again held that summary judgment for the employer was improper 
because the evidence raised a factual question as to whether the 
employer's proffered explanations -- that it had discharged the 
63-year-old plaintiff due to a company reorganization plan and 
dissatisfaction with his work performance -- was an attempt to 
conceal age discrimination.  Waldron, 56 F.3d at 502-03.  We 
viewed the district court's holding as requiring plaintiffs to 
bear the burden of demonstrating "pretext-plus," a burden we had 
explicitly rejected in Fuentes.  Id. at 495. 
         In Brewer, we again cited Fuentes for the proposition 
that a plaintiff will survive summary judgment if s/he can 
produce sufficient evidence that the employer's proffered 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action was not the 
true reason.  72 F.3d at 331.  Finding the evidence in Brewer's 
case sufficient to permit a jury to believe that the employer's 
claim of poor performance by the 53-year-old salesman was 
pretextual, we reversed the district court's entry of summary 
judgment on Brewer's ADEA claim.  Id. 
         The majority of other federal courts of appeals appear 
to have interpreted Hicks in a similar manner to this court's 
precedent.  See, e.g., Shaw v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, 
Inc., 79 F.3d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1996) (where defendant did not 
dispute that plaintiff made out a prima facie case and there was 
evidence that defendant had altered performance evaluations of 
plaintiff after firing him, "jury was entitled (although not 
required) to conclude . . . that the reasons given by the 
hospital for firing [plaintiff] were a pretext for age 
discrimination"); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) ("As Hicks explained, a factfinder's rejection of the 
employer's nondiscriminatory reasons, while not sufficient to 
compel a finding of discrimination, nonetheless suffices to 
permit such a finding."), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1037 
(1996); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 
1994) ("A finding of pretextuality allows a juror to reject a 
defendant's proffered reasons for a challenged employment action 
and thus permits the ultimate inference of discrimination."); 
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th 
Cir. 1994) ("Hicks clarified that the only effect of the 
employer's nondiscriminatory explanation is to convert the 
inference of discrimination based upon the plaintiff's prima 
facie case from a mandatory one which the jury must draw, to a 
permissive one the jury may draw, provided that the jury finds 
the employer's explanation `unworthy' of belief."); Anderson v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) (to 
defeat summary judgment, Title VII plaintiff "must only `produce 
evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that the 
company lied' about its proffered reasons for his dismissal" 
(citation omitted)); Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 
1316 (4th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff can defeat summary judgment by 
"present[ing] evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case, and . . . show[ing] that there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact about [the defendant's] proffered explanation" for 
its action); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 
1993) ("[A]s St. Mary's recognizes, the factfinder in a Title VII 
case is entitled to infer discrimination from plaintiff's proof 
of a prima facie case and showing of pretext without anything 
more . . . ."). 
         The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 
government agency charged with enforcement of the employment 
discrimination laws and an amicus curiae in this case, has also 
taken the view "that a prima facie case, coupled with a non- 
credible justification from the employer, is sufficient to 
support a finding of discrimination."  EEOC Enforcement Guidance 
on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, EEOC Comp. Man. (BNA), 
N:3361, 3363 n.3 (Apr. 12, 1994).  "As an administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency, these 
Guidelines, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of 
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance."  Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 
(1986)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
         The attack by DuPont and the dissent on the paradigm we 
and these other courts have constructed in the wake of Hicks is 
multi-faceted.  DuPont suggests that there is an inconsistency 
between this court's caselaw, as applied or articulated, and the 
requirement that the ultimate burden of persuasion of intentional 
discrimination must rest with the plaintiff.  We find no such 
inconsistency.  More important, the Supreme Court itself in Hicksexpressly 
stated that its various statements in that opinion as 
to the burden that plaintiff must bear, i.e. "it is not enough  
. . . to disbelieve the employer," 509 U.S. at 519, and the 
plaintiff must show "both that the reason was false, and that 
discrimination was the real reason," id. at 515, were not 
inconsistent with the statement in the opinion that "rejection of 
the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact 
to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination," id. at 
511.  Hicks explained that the statement that "rejection of the 
defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a 
finding of discrimination" was not inconsistent with its 
placement of the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff because 
"there must be a finding of discrimination."  Id. at 511 n.4 
(emphasis throughout discussion in original).  Thus, the Supreme 
Court has answered the very claim of inconsistency DuPont 
purports to find in our interpretation of Hicks. 
         Similarly unpersuasive is the dissent's suggestion that 
Fuentes impermissibly gives continuing weight to the presumption 
of discrimination created by the prima facie case even after the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption has dissipated or "burst."  This 
argument is based on the mistaken assumption that once the 
presumption of discrimination created initially by the prima 
facie case "drops from the case," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10, 
the underlying facts lose their probative value.  However, the 
Supreme Court specifically explained in Burdine that "[i]n saying 
that the presumption [of discrimination] drops from the case, we 
do not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider 
evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case. . . .  [T]his evidence and inferences properly 
drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the 
issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual."  Id.  
As long as the jury must make a finding of intentional 
discrimination, there is no reason why the evidence that 
supported the prima facie case coupled with the jury's 
determination that the employer's proffered explanations are 
pretextual is not sufficient to support a verdict of 
discrimination. 
         As Chief Justice, then Justice, Rehnquist earlier had 
explained, the initial presumption of discrimination arises from 
the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination "because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).   
He continued: 
         [W]e are willing to presume this largely 
         because we know from our experience that more 
         often than not people do not act in a totally 
         arbitrary manner, without any underlying 
         reasons, especially in a business setting.  
         Thus, when all legitimate reasons for 
         rejecting an applicant have been eliminated 
         as possible reasons for the employer's 
         actions, it is more likely than not the 
         employer, who we generally assume acts only 
         with some reason, based his decision on an 
         impermissible consideration such as race. 
 
Id. 
         This court has previously noted the probative 
significance of the factfinder's disbelief in a proffered 
explanation by a party, stating: 
         It has always been understood -- the 
         inference indeed is one of the simplest in 
         human experience -- that a party's falsehoodor other fraud in the 
preparation and 
         presentation of his cause, his fabrication or 
         suppression of evidence by bribery or 
         spoliation, is receivable against him as an 
         indication of his consciousness that his case 
         is a weak or unfounded one; and from that 
         consciousness may be inferred the fact itself 
         of the cause's lack of truth and merit.  
McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 921-22 (3d Cir. 
1985) (quoting 2 Wigmore § 278(2) (Chadbourne Rev. 1979)).  As 
another court recently remarked in the context of an employment 
discrimination case:  "Resort to a pretextual explanation is, 
like flight from the scene of a crime, evidence indicating 
consciousness of guilt, which is, of course, evidence of illegal 
conduct."  Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
         We presume that the same logic, albeit unarticulated, 
was the basis for the Supreme Court's statement in Hicks that 
disbelief of the employer's reason will permit the factfinder to 
infer the ultimate fact of discrimination, 509 U.S. at 511, even 
though the presumption of discrimination "drops from the case" 
after the employer proffers a legitimate reason for its actions, 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. 
         We routinely expect that a party give honest testimony 
in a court of law; there is no reason to expect less of an 
employer charged with unlawful discrimination.  If the employer 
fails to come forth with the true and credible explanation and 
instead keeps a hidden agenda, it does so at its own peril.  
Under those circumstances, there is no policy to be served by 
refusing to permit the jury to infer that the real motivation is 
the one that the plaintiff has charged. 
         The dissent concedes that in the usual case after the 
presumption created by the prima facie case has dissipated and 
sufficient evidence of pretext has been adduced, there will be 
sufficient evidence to support a verdict of discrimination.  The 
dissent is concerned that in the atypical case this may not be 
so.  It posits the situation of a plaintiff who claims multiple 
grounds, all illegal, for the employment action.  We see no 
reason to engage in a dialogue of speculation as to how to treat 
such a case, divorced from a factual record, particularly because 
the situation presented by the dissent was not the case in Hicks, 
where the plaintiff claimed race discrimination, was not the case 
in Fuentes, where the plaintiff claimed national origin 
discrimination, nor is it the case before us now, where Sheridan 
claims only sex discrimination. 
         The other situation posited by the dissent for its 
unwillingness to join the otherwise unanimous en banc court is 
that created where an employer "may not wish to disclose his real 
reasons for not promoting B over A."  Dissenting Typescript Op. 
at 22 n.8.  The persistence in maintaining that the employment 
action was taken because the plaintiff was unqualified or the 
position was being eliminated due to a reduction in force when 
the employer knows that the real reason is nepotism would violate 
the spirit if not the language of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  The dissent gives no reason why a plaintiff 
alleging discrimination is not entitled to the real reason for 
the personnel decision, no matter how uncomfortable the truth may 
be to the employer.  Surely, the judicial system has little to 
gain by the dissent's approach. 
         The Supreme Court has stated that an employer can meet 
its burden of articulating the reason for its action only through 
the introduction of admissible evidence.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
255 n.9.  Burden-shifting is designed "to sharpen the inquiry 
into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination."  
Id. at 255 n.8.  It follows that the Burdine analysis is rooted 
in the requirement that when the employer advances through 
admissible evidence the reasons for its actions, those must be 
its legitimate reasons. 
         The dissent argues that mere disbelief of the 
employer's articulated reason is not enough to sustain a verdict.  
Of course Hicks did not rely merely on the factfinder's disbelief 
of the explanation proffered by the employer to uphold a verdict 
for the employee.  Instead, as we have noted, under Hicks it is 
the combination of the disbelief in the employer's proffered 
explanation, the evidence that supported finding a prima facie 
case, and the jury's finding of intentional discrimination 
following a proper instruction to that effect. 
         Although the dissent states at the outset that its 
approach "does not mean that a plaintiff, in order to reach the 
trier of fact, must always prove 'pretext plus,' i.e., that the 
plaintiff must always produce some evidence in addition to what 
is necessary to establish a prima facie case and to show that the 
employer's explanation is pretextual," Dissenting Typescript Op. 
at 2 (emphasis added), the dissent's approach would bring the 
courts of this circuit back to the confusion and uncertainty 
created by the "pretext plus" and "some evidence" language that 
prompted this court to consider this case en banc. 
         In Sheridan's case, the district court had reviewed the 
evidence presented in connection with DuPont's motion for summary 
judgment and found that Sheridan had made out a prima facie case 
for gender discrimination culminating in constructive discharge.  
         Also, the district court had carefully instructed the 
jury on the need to find intentional discrimination before it 
could return a verdict for Sheridan on any of her claims.  Early 
in its charge the court had advised the jury that this case 
involves "allegations of intentional sexual discrimination, that 
is, of intentionally treating some people less favorably than 
others because of their gender."  App. at 111.  Again, in 
connection with the constructive discharge count the court had 
reminded the jury that Sheridan must prove "by a preponderance of 
the evidence that 1) defendant intentionally made plaintiff's 
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would 
feel forced to resign; 2) plaintiff's gender was the sole 
motivating factor in the defendant's conduct; and 3) plaintiff, 
in fact, resigned."  App. at 123.  The jury's verdict signifies 
that it rejected DuPont's proffered reasons for its employment 
action and believed that the real reason was discrimination. 
         In granting judgment as a matter of law for DuPont, the 
district court stated that "plaintiff would have to point to some 
evidence" that gender was the motive of those in the decision 
making process.  It is evident that the district court believed 
that something more was required than was set forth in Hicks and 
our cases.  Not only was such a requirement of additional 
evidence rejected in Fuentes where we stated that "if the 
plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the 
defendant's proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the 
plaintiff need not also come forward with additional evidence of 
discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case," 32 F.3d at 
764, but it is also inconsistent with the statement in Hicks that 
upon rejection of the defendants' proffered reasons for the 
action, "no additional proof of discrimination is required."  509 
U.S. at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
         As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]here will seldom be 
`eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."  
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 
711, 716 (1983).  We have recognized that "[d]iscrimination 
victims often come to the legal process without witnesses and 
with little direct evidence indicating the precise nature of the 
wrongs they have suffered."  Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 
826 F.2d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 
(1988).  Cases charging discrimination are uniquely difficult to 
prove and often depend upon circumstantial evidence.  See, e.g., 
Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081-82 (3d 
Cir. 1996); Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 
48 (3d Cir. 1989); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 
893, 897 (3d Cir.) (en banc) cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 
(1987); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir. 1984).  
"This is true in part because . . . discrimination . . . is often 
subtle."  Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899.  "[A]n employer who 
knowingly discriminates . . . may leave no written records 
revealing the forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to 
no one."  Id. (quoting LaMontagne v. American Convenience Prods., 
750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
         The distinct method of proof in employment 
discrimination cases, relying on presumptions and shifting 
burdens of articulation and production, arose out of the Supreme 
Court's recognition that direct evidence of an employer's 
motivation will often be unavailable or difficult to acquire.  
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact 
that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to 
come by."); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 
121 (1985) ("The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff has his day in 
court despite the unavailability of direct evidence." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) 
(recognizing that burden-shifting rules "are often created . . . 
to conform with a party's superior access to the proof"); 
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897; Dillon, 746 F.2d at 1003.   
         Thus, it is not only disbelief in the employer's 
proffered reason that would suffice to sustain the plaintiff's 
case, as the dissent argues.  It is the jury's determination that 
the reason given was pretextual together with the evidence that 
supported the prima facie case that will sustain a finding of 
intentional discrimination made after a proper charge. 
         The role of determining whether the inference of 
discrimination is warranted must remain within the province of 
the jury, because a finding of discrimination is at bottom a 
determination of intent.  In making that finding, the jury must 
perform its traditional function of assessing the weight of the 
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses through observation of 
both direct testimony and cross-examination at trial, and the 
strength of the inferences that can be drawn from the elements of 
the prima facie case and the evidence that undermines the 
employer's proffered reasons for its actions.  This is uniquely 
the role of the factfinder, not the court.  See Barber v. CSX 
Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 700 (3d Cir. 1995)("Evaluation 
of witness credibility is the exclusive function of the jury, and 
where the only evidence of intent is oral testimony, a jury could 
always choose to discredit it." (quoting Bhaya v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 1004 (1989))); see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 ("It is true 
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind 
at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as 
much a fact as anything else." (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 
29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885)); Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899 ("The 
issue of the defendant's intent at the time of the plaintiff's 
discharge is clearly a factual question."). 
         This does not mean that the courts in discrimination 
cases lose their traditional obligation, when faced with a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, to review the adequacy of the 
showing presented to the factfinder.  The district court must 
determine whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt upon 
the employer's proffered reasons to permit a reasonable  
factfinder to conclude that the reasons are incredible, and our 
previous cases have explained in detail the plaintiff's burden in 
this regard.  See, e.g., Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764-65 ("[T]he non- 
moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for 
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 
them `unworthy of credence . . . .'" (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, 
Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 (1993))).  But once the court is 
satisfied that the evidence meets this threshold requirement, it 
may not pretermit the jury's ability to draw inferences from the 
testimony, including the inference of intentional discrimination 
drawn from an unbelievable reason proffered by the employer. 
         With these legal principles before us, we turn to the 
district court's order granting judgment for DuPont as a matter 
of law on Sheridan's jury verdict that she was constructively 
discharged as a result of discrimination.  We exercise plenary 
review of the district court's order granting DuPont's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 
428, 431 (3d Cir. 1994).   
                                B. 
                          Factual Issues 
         We need not recount all of the evidence adduced at the 
trial because we examine the record with the limited purpose of 
ascertaining whether there was sufficient evidence to withstand 
judgment as a matter of law.  In doing so, we must look at the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Sheridan, the verdict 
winner, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.  SeeHofkin v. 
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 365, 369 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
         At the time of the events that formed the basis of this 
case, Sheridan was one of five head captains at the hotel, 
occupying the position of Head Captain of the Green Room for the 
breakfast and lunch shifts.  Sheridan, who began working at the 
hotel as a part-time waitress in 1979, reached that supervisory 
position in 1989 following a series of steady promotions.  In 
addition to those promotions, Sheridan had received numerous 
commendations for her job performance. 
         Focusing on the period immediately before that at 
issue, there was evidence that in May 1989 Sheridan was nominated 
by her peers and received an "Employee of the Quarter Award" for 
"outstanding" work.  She received merit raises in May 1990 and 
February 1991.  In July 1990 she received a "Way to Go" award 
from the Personnel & Administrative Services Division for "going 
beyond the call of duty."  DuPont's October 29, 1990 performance 
review, signed by two supervisors including defendant Jacques 
Amblard, rated Sheridan overall "very good," the second highest 
rating.  She was rated "outstanding" for "Interpersonal 
Relationships," "Planning/Organizing," and "Problem-Solving."  
Although that report noted that "[a]s a team player, 
strengthening is needed to improve the overall relationship with 
the rest of the operation," the report listed one of her 
strengths as "[v]ery good guest relations, organized."  The 
report stated that "Barbara's persistence has paid off by guest 
loyalty, staff does not call off sick, and overall very good 
morale from the support team."  Even Sheridan's lowest mark, 
given for "Attendance/Punctuality/Dependability," was 
"Satisfactory."  App. at 197-98. 
         In December 1990, Sheridan won a $1,000 accomplishment 
award.  The letter informing her of the award referred to her as 
"a role model" and "a true ambassador for the company."  App. at 
151.  Other restaurant employees received awards ranging from 
$200-$500, but Sheridan was the only employee to receive an award 
as high as $1000.  App. at 287.  In January 1991, Sheridan was 
chosen as one of about 20 DuPont employees to appear in a company 
video.  App. at 734.  On October 1, 1991, Sheridan received a 
promotion and salary increase. 
         DuPont attempted to paint a different picture to the 
jury.  Notwithstanding the record evidence of promotions and 
commendations, it contended that Sheridan's performance began to 
deteriorate in early 1991.  DuPont produced evidence that 
supervisors met with Sheridan, expressed dissatisfactions, and 
directed her to improve in various categories.  For example, in 
February 1991, Ed Barba, then the Green Room's Manager, listed 
"corrective measures" that Sheridan should take, including 
"maintaining an accurate cover count sheet" to insure that 
"covers" (customers) were distributed fairly among the staff, 
following the "grooming policy" which required that she report to 
work on time and in full dress, and refraining from using the 
Green Room as a break room and for smoking.  App. at 228.  
Nicholas Waller testified that in the summer of 1991, as Manager 
of Restaurants, he met with Sheridan to discuss alleged 
complaints that Sheridan had asked Green Room employees to help 
her with personal tasks, such as parking her car, giving her a 
wake-up call, or taking her personal mail to the post office, and 
that she had rewarded employees who complied by giving them 
additional "covers" in the dining room.  App. at 960-63. 
         On October 17, 1991, Jeff Maisel, by then the Manager 
of Restaurants, met with Sheridan to discuss problems allegedly 
perceived with her performance, including tardiness and 
continuing disregard for the hotel's grooming policy.  App. at 
206, 885.  On November 10, 1991, Maisel placed Sheridan on 
probation, ostensibly on the ground that she had not corrected 
her performance.  Maisel warned Sheridan that her failure to 
follow the hotel's policies could result in her termination.  
App. at 208. 
         In support of its claim of Sheridan's inadequate 
performance, DuPont introduced various notes and records that 
DuPont had compiled of specific infractions by Sheridan.  
Illustrative of DuPont's complaints is a memo by Barba to the 
file that on one occasion he had observed Sheridan smoking in the 
Green Room Bar and putting on makeup.  A report meticulously 
listed other details to support placing Sheridan on probation.  
DuPont contended that even while Sheridan was on probation, she 
continued her inadequate performance. 
         An important part of DuPont's defense for its 
employment actions centered on its claim that Sheridan had 
engaged in "comping," i.e., giving away complimentary food and 
drinks without ringing up complimentary checks.  The hotel began 
investigating Sheridan for this activity in late February, 1992, 
and its record of the investigation lists statements of numerous 
co-workers.  App. at 222-26.  James Dougherty, a bartender who 
was one of DuPont's principal witnesses on "comping," reported to 
DuPont that due to his concerns about numerous "discrepancies" 
and "cash handling problems" with Sheridan, he began to keep 
track of the amount of free liquor Sheridan gave away.  He 
recorded that it totaled $921.75 from November 1, 1991 to 
February 18, 1992, with $417.25 worth of drinks given away in 
December alone.  App. at 222.  Dougherty testified at trial that 
each time he saw Sheridan serve a free drink, he would record the 
date and dollar amount of the drink, and claimed that his dates 
were about "98-percent accurate."  App. at 688. 
         Maisel testified that based on the hotel's internal 
investigation, DuPont decided that Sheridan should be reassigned 
to a non-supervisory position that would not require her to 
handle cash.  App. at 910.  Sheridan was offered three options:  
front desk receptionist, banquet server, or health club 
attendant, with no diminution of salary.  The hotel claimed that 
she would be eligible for advancement in any of those positions, 
although Sheridan offered evidence at trial that suggested 
otherwise.  See App. at 473-75, 776.  After considering the offer 
for some weeks, Sheridan resigned.   
         Sheridan's testimony at trial portrayed the events 
differently than did DuPont.  It was her position that the 
alleged dissatisfaction with her performance stemmed from her 
complaint of sex discrimination which she made in the fall of 
1991, when the hotel reorganized its structure to eliminate the 
individual restaurant managers and to place a new manager over 
all of the restaurants in the hotel.  The hotel did not advertise 
the position, considered only five of its own employees for the 
new post (all men), and selected Maisel.  DuPont did not consider 
Sheridan for the position, id., and Sheridan complained to 
Amblard at least three times in the period of September and 
October 1991 that she was not promoted due to gender 
discrimination.  App. at 51-52.  She also testified that around 
this time, Amblard told her repeatedly that he planned to watch 
her "like a dog" and "like a hawk."  App. at 748.  Sheridan's 
position was that the hotel's recordkeeping of details of her 
daily activity was "nitpicking" in retaliation for her complaints 
of sex discrimination.  App. at 1337.  She further sought to 
portray Amblard as a sexist and testified that, when she was with 
one of the other male supervisors, he would ignore her and 
instead speak only to the man.  App. at 748. 
         In addition to the affirmative evidence of her own 
accomplishments, Sheridan presented evidence at trial that was 
directed to impeaching the credibility of DuPont's witnesses, 
particularly, but not limited to, Dougherty and Maisel.  Sheridan 
demonstrated that for two weeks in January 1992, during which 
Dougherty listed three dates when she allegedly dispensed free 
drinks, she had reported for jury duty at the Superior Court.  
App. at 173-79, 540-43.  Even a document handwritten by Maisel 
showed that another head captain was scheduled to cover 
Sheridan's shift on those days.  App. at 167.  Maisel's schedule 
also indicated that Sheridan was not scheduled for work on 
December 23 and 24, 1991, although Dougherty's list included 
these dates among those when Sheridan allegedly required him to 
deliver complimentary drinks.  App. at 167, 227, 540.  In fact, 
Maisel's written work schedule could be viewed as contradicting 
Dougherty's list as to seven separate dates. 
         In seeking to show the pretextual nature of DuPont's 
articulated reasons, Sheridan noted, inter alia, the temporal 
proximity of her complaints to Amblard of sex discrimination and 
his statements that he would watch her like a "hawk" to the 
subsequent surfacing of dissatisfaction with her performance, the 
meticulous recordkeeping of the details of her daily activities, 
and the hotel's investigations into her alleged "comping."   
         Thus, it is clear that the jury in this case was faced 
with evidence on both sides of the issues raised by the parties.  
The jury's verdict for Sheridan on her constructive discharge 
claim shows that the jury accepted Sheridan's view on this claim 
and rejected DuPont's explanation as pretextual. 
         We have previously cautioned that "[i]n determining 
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain liability, the 
court may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of 
witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for the jury's 
version."  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 
(3d Cir. 1993).  A reasonable jury could have disbelieved 
DuPont's proffered reasons for its actions based on Sheridan's 
evidence and its rejection of the credibility of certain of 
DuPont's principal witnesses, such as Dougherty and Maisel.  We 
find no paucity of evidence on which the jury could have based 
its finding for Sheridan on her constructive discharge claim. 
         Under the applicable law, a plaintiff who voluntarily 
resigned may maintain a case of constructive discharge when the 
employer's allegedly discriminatory conduct creates an atmosphere 
that is the constructive equivalent of a discharge.  See Gray v. 
York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 (3d Cir. 1992).  We 
apply an objective test to determine whether "the employer 
knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so 
intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would 
resign."  Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 
(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 
F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
         In denying DuPont's motion for summary judgment, the 
district court rejected DuPont's argument that there was no basis 
on which a jury could find that the conditions to which Sheridan 
claimed she was subjected could have reached the level that would 
constitute a constructive discharge.  Instead, the court held 
that if Sheridan's version of the facts were accepted by a trier 
of fact, it would be reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude 
that resignation was Sheridan's only option.  Thus, when the 
court instructed the jury, it charged that for the jury to find 
that DuPont constructively discharged Sheridan, she must have 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that DuPont 
"intentionally made [her] working conditions so intolerable that 
a reasonable person would feel forced to resign" and that 
"[Sheridan's] gender was the sole motivating factor in the 
defendant's conduct."  App. at 1487. 
         The evidence of the series of investigative activities, 
allegations of improprieties, placement on probation after more 
than a decade of satisfactory performance, and the ultimate 
removal of Sheridan from her supervisory position in the highly 
reputed Green Room to one of three far less prestigious dead-end 
positions, such as the health club attendant, could have been 
viewed by the jury as meeting the criteria of a constructive 
discharge.  The jury returned an unqualified verdict finding that 
DuPont had constructively discharged Sheridan and did so based on 
her gender.  We cannot hold that Sheridan failed to present 
sufficient evidence to withstand DuPont's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, and therefore will reverse the district court's 
order to that effect. 
                               C.   
                       Grant of a New Trial 
         Because the district court's ruling focused primarily 
on its decision to grant DuPont's motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, the court's explanation for its grant of a new trial was 
brief.  The court noted in a footnote that it was obliged under  
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(c) to make a conditional ruling on the 
defendant's motion for a new trial.  To comply with that 
requirement, the court stated merely that it "would grant the 
motion for a new trial because the jury's verdict is contrary to 
the weight of the evidence."  Sheridan (July 14, 1994) at 12 
n.11. 
         We are unable to ascertain the extent to which this 
ruling was affected by the court's misconception that direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to sustain the 
jury's verdict, i.e., its understanding that "[i]n order to 
demonstrate that gender was a motivating factor, plaintiff would 
have to point to some evidence that that was the motive of those 
in the decision-making process."  D. Ct. Opinion at 11-12.  
Because such evidence is not a prerequisite to a finding of 
intentional discrimination, we believe the district court should 
reconsider whether a new trial is warranted in light of the 
correct legal principles. 
         It is also unclear whether the district court applied 
the complete test for ruling on a new trial motion.  In granting 
that motion, the district court merely concluded that the jury's 
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.  Although we 
recognize that a new trial may be granted even if the evidence is 
legally sufficient to support the verdict, Roebuck v. Drexel 
Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1988), we have nonetheless 
cautioned that a district court should grant a new trial on the 
basis that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence 
"only where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict 
were to stand," Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 
1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 1991).  We have explained that this stringent 
standard is necessary "to ensure that a district court does not 
substitute its `judgment of the facts and the credibility of the 
witnesses for that of the jury.  Such an action effects a 
denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials 
are granted the judge takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime 
function of the jury as the trier of facts.'"  Fineman v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir.) 
(en banc), cert denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960)), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 921 (1993). 
         Therefore, before imposing on Sheridan the burden and 
expense of a new trial, we will remand to require the district 
court to determine whether, inasmuch as Sheridan was not obliged 
to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the jury's 
verdict for Sheridan was against the great weight of the evidence 
and would effect a miscarriage of justice.  
         We have previously remarked that the district court's 
instruction to the jury placed on Sheridan a higher burden of 
proof than our cases require.  See note 2, supra.  If there were 
a new trial, Sheridan would not have to prove that discrimination 
was the sole cause of DuPont's action but only that 
discrimination was a motivating factor in its decision.  SeeMiller v. 
CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
         Sheridan has raised other trial errors to support her 
motion for a new trial, but we need consider briefly only one.  
Sheridan argues that the district court erred in excluding 
testimony of a female co-worker that Amblard stated, after 
watching a woman in a tight dress walk by, that he "would like to 
grab that," App. at 699-700, 1520, and that on another occasion 
Amblard rejected her offer to park cars at the hotel on the 
ground that she could not park cars because she was a woman.  
App. at 1521.  The district court excluded this testimony under 
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, finding these statements 
"prejudicial and irrelevant."  App. at 44.  We review a district 
court's rulings concerning the admission of evidence for abuse of 
discretion.  Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 
(3d Cir. 1994).  Although Amblard's comments would be relevant 
to determining whether he was biased against women generally and 
therefore the district court took too narrow a view in holding 
that they had no probative value, we cannot conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion in deciding that Amblard's 
statements were more prejudicial than probative of the ultimate 
issue of whether DuPont's employment actions as to Sheridan were 
caused by gender-based animus.  We turn then to the final issue 
before us, the court's dismissal of Amblard as a defendant. 
                                D. 
               Individual Liability Under Title VII 
         Sheridan contends that the district court erred in 
dismissing Jacques Amblard as a defendant on the ground that 
individual employees may not be held liable under Title VII. 
         Title VII provides, in relevant part: 
         It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
         for an employer-- 
 
              (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
         discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
         discriminate against any individual with 
         respect to his compensation, terms, 
         conditions, or privileges of employment, 
         because of such individual's race, color, 
         religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).  The statute defines 
"employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a 
person."  Id. § 2000e(b). 
         Sheridan argues that there is no language in the 
statute excluding individuals, and she looks to the law of agency 
to support the proposition that agents can be held jointly liable 
with employers for wrongs resulting from their tortious conduct. 
She also contends that we should interpret the 1991 amendments, 
which added to the remedies provided in Title VII a provision for 
compensatory and punitive damages, as suggesting that Congress 
intended to hold individual defendants liable because, unlike 
equitable remedies such as reinstatement which are uniquely 
available from an employer, these newly available monetary 
remedies can be forthcoming from an employee. 
         These arguments are not without some force.  However, 
the clear majority of the courts of appeals that have considered 
this question have held that individual employees cannot be held 
liable under Title VII.  See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 
(7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d 
Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 569 (1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 574 (1994); Miller v. 
Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994).  Others appear to lean in that 
direction, see, e.g., Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, 
Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995)(interpreting parallel state 
statute to preclude employee liability); Birkbeck v. Marvel 
Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-511 & n.1)(4th Cir.)(deciding 
issue under ADEA as to "personnel decisions of a plainly 
delegable character"), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 666 (1994), while 
others have either permitted liability in an employee's official 
capacity only, see Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th 
Cir. 1995); Garcia v. ELF Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 
n.2 (5th Cir. 1994), or left the issue an "open question," Ball 
v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1995).   
         In our independent examination of this issue, we find 
most significant the fact that when Congress amended the statute 
in 1991 to provide a detailed sliding scale of damages ranging 
from $50,000 for an employer of more than 14 and fewer than 101 
employees, to $300,000 for employers with more than 500  
employees, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), it made no reference as to 
the amount of damages, if any, that would be payable by 
individuals.  This strongly suggests that Congress did not 
contemplate that such damages would be assessed against 
individuals who are not themselves the employing entity.  SeeTomka, 66 
F.3d at 1315; Maxwell's, 991 F.2d at 587 n.2; Ascolese 
v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D.Pa. 
1995), modified on other grounds, 925 F. Supp. 351 (1996). 
         Moreover, we note that Congress had previously 
expressed its concern about the impact of Title VII litigation on 
small businesses when it excluded businesses with fewer than 
fifteen employees from the definition of an "employer."  It is 
reasonable to infer that Congress's concern in that regard 
applies as well to individuals.  See Williams, 72 F.3d at 553; 
Tomka 66 F.3d at 1314 (citing remarks of legislators indicating 
concern with burdens imposed upon small businesses forced to 
defend against Title VII suits); Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. 
         For these reasons, as well as some of the others cited 
by the other circuits, we are persuaded that Congress did not 
intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII. 
 
                               III. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's entry of judgment in DuPont's favor on the constructive 
discharge claim, and remand to the district court to reconsider 
DuPont's motion for a new trial.   
 
                     Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont 
No. 94-7509 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
 
         I join part IID of the opinion of the court.  I also 
agree with the court's disposition of the plaintiff's evidentiary 
argument.  See Maj. Op. 37-38.  I dissent, however, from parts 
IIA - C of the court's opinion. 
 
                                I.   
 
         My primary disagreement with the majority concerns the 
test for determining whether a defense motion for summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law should be granted in an 
employment discrimination case governed by the procedural scheme 
sanctioned in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973).  Like several other courts of appeals, see Maj. Op. 15- 
16, the majority here holds that when the plaintiff has made out 
a prima facie case and has offered enough evidence to support a 
finding that the explanation was pretextual, a defense motion for 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law must always be 
denied.  However, there is strong contrary authority, which the 
majority does not acknowledge.  The in banc Fifth Circuit, by a 
vote of 16 to 1, has rejected the majority's position.  Rhodes v. 
Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (in banc).  
So have the First and Eleventh Circuits.  Isenbergh v. Knight- 
Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 442-43 (11th Cir. 
1996); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260-61 n.3 
 
(1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 
842-43 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1398 (1994).  I 
believe that these other courts have analyzed the question more 
accurately than the majority has here. 
         If the majority had merely said that, under the 
circumstances described above, a defense motion for summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law must generally be denied, 
I would agree.  When a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and 
there is sufficient evidence in the record to permit a rational 
trier of fact to find that the employer's explanation is untrue, 
a defense motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of 
law should usually be denied.  But not always, as the majority 
contends.   
         In my view, the correct test is the following: a 
defense motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of 
law should be granted when the evidence in the record could not 
persuade a rational trier of fact that intentional discrimination 
on the ground alleged by the plaintiff was a determinative cause 
of the challenged employment action.  This does not mean that a 
plaintiff, in order to reach the trier of fact, must always prove 
"pretext plus," i.e., that the plaintiff must always produce some 
evidence in addition to what is necessary to establish a prima 
facie case and to show that the employer's explanation is 
pretextual.  On the contrary, in most cases, such additional 
proof is not needed.  But I disagree with the majority that proof 
of the elements of the prima facie case and proof of pretext are 
always enough.   
 
                             II. 
 
         A.  The key to the question at issue lies in the nature 
of the "presumption" of discrimination that arises when the 
plaintiff establishes the elements of a prima facie case.  In 
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 
(1981), the Court explained that the "[e]stablishment of the 
prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the 
employer discriminated against the employee."  This presumption 
"places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation 
to rebut the prima facie case -- i.e., the burden of producing 
evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken `for a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.'"  St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993), (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
254).  But while this presumption shifts the burden of production 
to the defendant, "`[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier 
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'"  Hicks, 
509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).  "In this 
regard," Hicks observed, "it operates like all presumptions, as 
described in Federal Rule of Evidence 301."  509 U.S. at 507. 
         Critical for present purposes is what happens when the 
defendant satisfies its production burden.  Burdine addressed 
this question in the following passage: 
         If the defendant carries this burden of production,  
         the presumption raised by the prima facie case is 
         rebutted, 10/ and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new 
         level of specificity. 
 
                         
         10/ See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on 
         Evidence 346 (1898).  In saying that the presumption 
         drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of 
         fact no longer may consider evidence previously 
         introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie 
         case.  A satisfactory explanation by the defendant 
         destroys the legally mandatory inference of 
         discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial 
         evidence.  Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences 
         properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier 
         of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's 
         explanation is pretextual . . . . 
 
450 U.S. at 255 & n.10. 
         Hicks similarly explained that, if the defendant meets 
its production burden, "the McDonnell Douglas framework -- with 
its presumptions and burdens -- is no longer relevant" and should 
not be "resurrect[ed.]"  509 U.S. at 510.  "The presumption, 
having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come 
forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture," and 
"the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question:  
whether plaintiff has proven that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against him [on the ground alleged.']"  Hicks, 509 
U.S. at 510-11 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). 
 
         B.  I interpret these passages to mean that the 
McDonnell Douglas presumption is governed by the "bursting 
bubble" theory associated with Professor James Bradley Thayer.  
See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 344 at 462 (4th ed. 1992).  Under 
this theory, "the only effect of a presumption is to shift the 
burden of producing evidence with regard to the presumed fact.  
If that evidence is produced by the adversary, the presumption is 
spent and disappears."  Id.  The case then proceeds "as though 
there had never been a presumption at all."  1 Weinstein's 
Evidence ¶300[01] at 300-4 (1996)(footnote omitted).   
         That Burdine and Hicks regarded the McDonnell Douglaspresumption 
as governed by this theory is suggested by the 
following.  First, Burdine states that the term "presumption" 
properly "`refers only to a device for allocating the production 
burden,'" 450 U.S. at 254 n.8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
-- the orthodox "bursting bubble" view.  Second, both Burdine and 
Hicks employ classic "bursting bubble" language to describe what 
happens to a presumption if the defendant satisfies its 
production burden: the presumption then "drops from the case," 
"drops out of the picture," is "no longer relevant," and 
should not be "resurrect[ed]."  Third, Burdine's footnote 10, 
which was quoted above, appears to set out the pure "bursting 
bubble" theory: once the presumption is burst, all that remains 
is "the plaintiff's initial evidence" and "inferences properly 
drawn therefrom."  450 U.S. at 255 n.10.  In addition, this 
footnote begins with a citation to Thayer, who stated that once 
the opponent of a presumption offers sufficient counterproof, 
"[all is then turned into an ordinary question of evidence, and 
the two or three general facts presupposed in the rule of 
presumption take their place with the rest, and operate, with 
their own natural force, as a part of the total mass of probative 
matter."  James B. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 346 
(1898).  Finally, both Burdine and Hicks invoke Federal Rule of 
Evidence 301, which has generally been interpreted as embodying 
the "bursting bubble" theory.  See e.g., McKenna v. Pacific Rail 
Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 829-30 (3d Cir. 1994); id. at 841 (Mansmann, 
J., dissenting); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr., 960 
F.2d 1020, 1037-1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Yoder Co., 758 F.2d 
1114, 1120 & n.13 (6th Cir. 1985); Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 
5-7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 10 Moore's Federal Practice § 301.04 [4.-1] 
at III-22 (1995-96 Supp.); 1 Weinstein's Evidence 301-9; 9 
Wigmore on Evidence § 2491(2) (3d ed. 1940).   
         In McKenna, supra, all of the panel members agreed that 
the McDonnell Douglas presumption and Federal Rule of Evidence 
301 embody the "bursting bubble" theory.  Writing for the 
majority, Judge Lewis concluded that the McDonnell Douglaspresumption is 
governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 301 and that 
under this rule "the introduction of evidence to rebut a 
presumption destroys that presumption, leaving only that evidence 
and its inferences to be judged against the competing evidence 
and its inferences to determine the ultimate question at issue."  
32 F.3d at 830.  Judge Lewis then went on to hold that the same 
rule applies under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  
Id.  In dissent, Judge Mansmann agreed that the "bursting bubble" 
theory applies to federal claims, but contended that the New 
Jersey presumption has a more durable effect.  Specifically, she 
wrote that "the federal rule `bursts the bubble' of the 
presumption, while the New Jersey rule creates an issue for the 
jury."  Id. at 841 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).  With respect to 
their analysis of federal law, I think that both the McKennamajority and 
dissent were right.   
         C.  The version of Rule 301 that was proposed by the 
Advisory Committee and promulgated by the Supreme Court rejected 
the "bursting bubble" theory in favor of the theory advocated by   
Professor Edmund M. Morgan and others.  Proposed Rule of 
Evidence 301 and Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 
(1973).  Under this proposed rule, a presumption would have 
shifted the burden of persuasion.  Id.  
         Congress, however, rejected this proposal.  The House 
of Representatives instead adopted a rule that represented an 
"intermediate position" between the "Thayer" and "Morgan" 
theories.  H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7081.  The House rule 
provided that "a presumption imposes on the party against whom it 
is directed the burden of going forward with the evidence, and, 
even though met with contradicting evidence, is sufficient proof 
of the fact presumed to be considered by the trier of fact."  120 
Cong. Rec. 2370 (1974). 
         In the Senate, the Advisory Committee and the Judicial 
Conference's Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure 
advocated a return to the originally proposed version of Rule 
301.  Dismissing the House compromise as conceptually unsound, 
the committee argued that "[t]he basic choice is between the so- 
called `bursting bubble' theory and one shifting the burden of 
persuasion."  Reporter's Memorandum, for the Advisory Committee 
on Evidence and the Standing Committee, to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, reprinted in 1 Weinstein's Evidence at 301-3.  The 
Senate rejected the House approach and passed the present version 
of Rule 301.  S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.     , 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7056; 120 Cong. Rec. 37,085 
(1974). 
         The Advisory Committee and the Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure then turned to the Conference Committee 
and again urged the adoption of the originally proposed version 
of Rule 301, arguing once more that "[b]asically the choice to be 
made in treating the effect to be given presumptions lies between 
giving them only the effect of a `bursting bubble' and giving 
them the greater effect of imposing a burden of disproof once 
evidence has established the conditions that call the presumption 
into operation."  See 1 Weinstein's Evidence at 301-7.  However, 
the Conference Committee recommended adoption of the Senate 
version, Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.    (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7099, and this 
recommendation was enacted.  120 Cong. Rec. 40,070, 40,897 
(1974). 
         Rule 301 states: 
         In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise 
         provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a 
         presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
         directed the burden of going forward with evidence to 
         rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to 
         such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk 
         of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial 
         upon the party on whom it was originally cast. 
 
         Like the members of the McKenna panel and the other 
previously mentioned authorities, I think that the most 
reasonable interpretation of Rule 301 is that it incorporates the 
"bursting bubble" theory.  The text of the rule supports this 
conclusion since it does not even hint that a presumption does 
anything but shift the burden of production.  If Congress had 
intended for a presumption to have any further effect, such as 
guaranteeing that the presumed fact would not be rejected at the 
summary-judgment or judgment-as-a-matter-of-law stage, I think  
that Congress would have said so in the text of the rule.  I do 
not think that Congress would have left it for the courts to 
divine, without any clue in the language of the rule, that a 
presumption should have such an important additional effect.  
         Furthermore, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress, advised that it was compelled to choose between the 
Thayer and Morgan approaches, adopted "the pure Thayer rule."  1 
Weinstein's Evidence at 301-9.  Professors Wright and Graham 
disagree with this position based on a passage in the Conference 
Report.  See 21 Charles A. Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 
Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 5120 at 547 & n.27, 5126 at 
609-10 & nn.23-24 (1977).  Discussing the consequences that 
follow when the adverse party meets its production burden, the 
Conference Report states: 
         If the adverse party does offer evidence contradicting 
         the presumed fact, the court cannot instruct the jury 
         that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact 
         from proof of the basic facts.  The court may, however, 
         instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of 
         the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. 
 
Conf. Rep. 93-1597, supra, at   , reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 7099 (emphasis deleted; emphasis added).  Because the 
highlighted sentence discusses jury instructions, Professors 
Wright and Graham view it as showing that the Conference 
Committee contemplated that a presumption, even if met with 
enough counterproof to satisfy the adverse party's production 
burden, would nevertheless serve to take the factual question to 
the jury.  21 Wright and Graham, supra, § 5126 at 610 n.23. 
         Like the Sixth Circuit, In re Yoder Co., 758 F.3d at 
1119-20 n.13, I do not find this interpretation compelling.  The 
Sixth Circuit wrote: 
         The emphasized portion of this quotation is not 
         inconsistent with the bursting bubble theory. . . .   
         The statement that the jury may be instructed to 
         consider an inference is most naturally read as 
         permitting such an instruction when called for by the 
         existence of a logical inference. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original).  This reading is at least as 
reasonable as the alternative offered by Professors Wright and 
Graham, and I am therefore unwilling, based solely on the 
statement in question, to conclude that Rule 301 was intended to 
give presumptions an important effect not mentioned in the text 
of the rule.   
         I must acknowledge that a passage in Hicks may be read 
as supporting Professors Wright and Graham's argument, at least 
with respect to the McDonnell Douglas presumptions.  Hicksstated: 
         The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward 
         by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is 
         accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together 
         with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to 
         show intentional discrimination.  Thus, rejection of 
         the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier 
         of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional 
         discrimination,4/ and the Court of Appeals was correct 
         when it noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o 
         additional proof of discrimination is required." 
          
                            
          4/ Contrary to the dissent's confusion-producing  
         analysis, post, at 535-536, there is nothing whatever 
         inconsistent between this statement and our later 
         statements that (1) the plaintiff must show "both that 
         the reason was false, and that discrimination was the 
         real reason," infra, at 515, and (2) "it is not enough 
         . . . to disbelieve the employer," infra, at 519.  Even 
         though (as we say here) rejection of the defendant's 
         proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding 
         of discrimination, there must be a finding of 
         discrimination. 
 




         Read in isolation, this passage may seem to suggest 
that the facts underlying the prima facie case plus the rejection 
of the employer's explanation are always sufficient to take the 
case to the jury.  This is the interpretation adopted in Fuentes 
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994), and by the majority 
here.  See Maj. Op. 11-12.  However, like the First, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuits, I do not think that this reading is compelled. 
See Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 442-45; Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993-95; 
Woods, 30 F.3d at 260-61 n.3.  Instead, I believe that this 
passage can reasonably be interpreted as simply rejecting the 
"pretext plus" approach that Justice Souter attributed to the 
Court in his dissent (509 U.S. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting)) 
to which the Court referred.  509 U.S. at 511 n.4.   Under the 
"pretext plus" approach, as summarized in the law review article 
that Justice Souter cited, "the plaintiff must produce some 
additional evidence other than the evidence supporting the prima 
facie case and other than the fact of the defendant's deception."  
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: 
The Fallacy of the `Pretext-Plus' Rule in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 43 Hastings L.J. 57, 87-88 (1991).  The 
previously quoted passage from Hicks may be interpreted to mean 
that such additional proof (i.e., the "plus" in "pretext plus") 
is not always required.  Accordingly, when the Court wrote (509 
U.S. at 511) that "rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons 
will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of 
intentional discrimination," what the Court may have meant is 
that the trier of fact is permitted to draw such an inference -- 
in the sense that the trier of fact is not precluded by any legal 
rule, such as "pretext plus," from doing so -- if such an 
inference is factually warranted.  The same interpretation may be 
given to the Court's subsequent statement that "upon [the] 
rejection [of the defendant's proffered reason] `[n]o additional 
proof of discrimination is required,'" 509 U.S. at 511.  "`No 
additional proof is required'" in that there is no blanket legal 
requirement of such proof, as there would be under the "pretext 
plus" approach.  Similarly, the "rejection of the defendant's 
proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of 
discrimination" (id. at 511 n.4) in the sense that no other 
blanket legal requirement, such as proving the "plus," is needed.  
I favor this interpretation because it is consistent with my 
conclusion, discussed above, that Rule 301 presumptions in 
general and the McDonnell Douglas presumption in particular are 
governed by the "bursting bubble" theory. 
         D.  If it is true, as I believe, that the McDonnell 
Douglas presumption is governed by the pure "bursting bubble" 
theory, it follows that the majority's blanket rule barring 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
defendant is unsound.  It is well recognized that under the pure 
"bursting bubble" theory, once a presumption is destroyed, the 
proponent of the presumption has no guarantee that its case will 
go to the trier of fact.  One treatise states that the previously 
presumed fact may then be found "only if the natural probative 
force of the basic facts that brought the presumption into play 
is sufficient to support such a finding (or the evidence as a 
whole supports it).  Otherwise, the presumed fact may not be 
found, and the presumption does not protect this possibility."  1 
Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence§ 70 at 
332 (1994) (emphasis added).  Another observes:  "The 
opponent of the presumption may still not be entitled to a 
directed verdict, but if its motion is denied, the ruling will 
have nothing to do with the existence of a presumption."  2  
McCormick on Evidence, § 344 at 462.  See also 21 Wright and 
Graham, Federal Practice § 5122 at 564.  In Thayer's words, after 
the presumption is spent, "[a]ll is then turned into an ordinary 
question of evidence."   Thayer, Preliminary Treatise at 346. 
                         
                               III. 
                                 
         Once it is recognized that the McDonnell Douglaspresumption 
disappears in the face of sufficient counterproof, 
the test to be applied in ruling on a defense motion for summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law is clear: the motion 
should be granted if all of the evidence in the record and the 
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence could not 
persuade a rational trier of fact that intentional discrimination 
on the ground alleged by the plaintiff was a determinative cause 
of the challenged action.  This test follows from the following 
three rules: 
         1.  In a McDonnell Douglas case, "[t]he ultimate burden 
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the 
plaintiff."  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Hicks, 509 U.S. 
at 507. 
          2.  This burden requires proof that discrimination on 
the ground alleged was a determinative cause of the challenged 
action.  Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (in 
banc).   
         3.  Summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law 
are proper where a trier of fact could not rationally return a 
verdict in favor of the opposing party.  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986).   
         Putting these rules together, it is apparent that a 
defense motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of 
law should be granted where a trier of fact could not rationally 
find based on the record (and giving no further consideration to 
the presumption as such) that discrimination on the ground 
alleged was a determinative cause of the challenged action.   
         The majority, however, takes the position that such a 
motion must be denied whenever there is enough evidence to 
support a finding that the explanation offered by the employer is 
untrue.  See Maj. Op. 13.  This position can be correct only if 
proof that is sufficient to justify disbelief of the employer's 
explanation (the majority's test) will always be enough to 
justify a finding by a rational trier of fact that discrimination 
on the ground alleged was a determinative cause of the challenged 
action.  Unless this relationship invariably holds true -- and I 
will show below that it does not (see part VI, infra) -- the 
majority's blanket rule is wrong. 
 
                                V. 
   
         Before turning directly to that question, however, it 
is helpful to examine the types of evidence of discrimination 
that may exist in the record of a discriminatory-treatment case 
after the McDonnell Douglas presumption is burst and sufficient 
evidence to show pretext is offered.  This evidence may be 
grouped into four categories.   
         A.  First, there are the facts that the plaintiff 
proved to make out the prima facie case and the inferences to 
which those facts naturally give rise.  In some cases, the 
"natural probative force" of these facts is substantial, but in 
others it is relatively weak.  "The burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous," Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 253, and "evidence sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case is not always sufficient to support the ultimate 
finding of intentional discrimination. . . .  Where the evidence 
behind the prima facie showing is strong, it may, standing alone, 
justify a finding of intentional discrimination. . . .  But where 
the prima facie case is based on minimal evidence, it cannot."  
United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 27 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1994).  
         An example which the prima facie case gives rise to 
only a weak inference of discrimination is the age discrimination 
case in which a somewhat younger person is hired, promoted, 
retained, etc. instead of a slightly older person.  Under our 
cases, a plaintiff in an age discrimination suit can make out a 
prima facie case by showing that he or she (1) was over 40 years 
of age at the time in question, (2) applied for and was minimally 
qualified for the job, (3) but was rejected (4) in favor of a 
person who was "`sufficiently younger to permit an inference of 
age discrimination.'"   Barber v. CSX Distribution Services, 68 
F.3d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1995), quoting Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 
F.2d 59, 61 (3d Cir. 1989).  With respect to the final element of 
this formulation, we have held that an eight-year gap is enough 
and have suggested that a five-year difference may suffice.  
Barber, 68 F.3d at 695.  Thus, I believe that a plaintiff 
claiming that he or she was denied a promotion due to age 
discrimination could make out a prima facie case under our 
circuit law by showing, for example, that he or she (1) was 43 
years old at the time in question, (2) had the minimum requisite 
qualifications, (3) and applied for the job, but that (4) the 
employer instead chose a 35-year old.  
         I agree that these facts permit an inference of age 
discrimination, but I do not think that a reasonable person could 
give these facts, standing alone, much weight.  A way to test 
this hypothesis is to ask: if you knew nothing more about this 
promotion decision, how much would you bet that, when all the 
facts were revealed, the reason for the decision would turn out 
to be age discrimination?  I think that few people would be 
willing to wager much on this bet -- precisely because the 
natural probative force of the few facts needed to establish the 
prima facie case is slight.  
         A similar situation can arise in cases of alleged 
national origin or religious discrimination.  In order to make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination on these grounds, a 
plaintiff must show that he or she (1) is a member of a national 
origin group or adherent of a religion, (2) applied or was 
considered for the position or benefit, and (3) was at least 
minimally qualified, but (4) the position or benefit went to a 
person of another national origin or religion.  See, e.g., Vitug 
v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing that he was 
a qualified Filipino Catholic and that promotion went to "a non- 
Filipino and born-again Christian").  How strong an inference of 
national origin or religious discrimination naturally arises from 
such a bare showing?     
         Suppose that all that you knew about an employment 
decision was that the employer rejected an applicant who traced 
his or her national origin to one country and instead chose 
another person who did not trace his or her national origin to 
that particular country.  How confident would you be that the 
reason for the decision, when all the facts were revealed, would 
turn out to be national origin discrimination? 
         Or suppose that all that you knew about an employment 
decision was that the employer rejected a minimally qualified 
Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Muslim, or adherent of another 
religion in favor of another employee of a different religion.  
How confident would you be that the reason for the decision, when 
all the facts were revealed, would be intentional discrimination 
on the basis of religion?  In my view, most rational people, 
without knowing more, would have little confidence that the real 
reason would turn out to be national origin or religious 
discrimination, and I therefore submit that these bare facts 
naturally give rise to only a slight inference of discrimination.  
And, although I will not belabor the point by posing further 
examples, I think that the natural probative force of the prima 
facie case is sometimes weak in race and gender cases as well.  
In short, I submit that the natural probative force of the facts 
underlying the prima facie case varies from case to case and that 
in some cases that force will be too weak on its own to sustain a 
finding of discrimination.   
         B.  Second, there is the inference of discrimination 
that may often be drawn from the ruling out of the employer's 
explanation.  The degree to which such an inference is justified, 
however, is inversely proportional to the degree to which the 
record contains evidence of a third possible explanation for the 
challenged employment action.  For example, if it is certain that 
an employee was discharged for either reason "a" or reason "b" 
and no other, and if reason "b" can be ruled out, then obviously 
it may be inferred that the real reason for the discharge was 
"a."  But if an employee was discharged for either reason "a," 
reason "b," or reason "c," then ruling out reason "b" does not 
necessarily permit a strong inference that reason "a" was the 
real reason. 
         Cases in which the record contains strong evidence of a 
third explanation for the challenged action are by no means 
unknown.  See Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Perhaps the clearest examples are cases in which the 
plaintiff challenges a single adverse employment action based on 
two or more alternative grounds, a rather common tactic.  See, 
e.g., Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(plaintiff alleged race, national origin, gender, and age 
discrimination); Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank of N.J., 1996 
WL 589189, No. 95-5603 (3d Cir. Oct. 15, 1996); Rabinovitz v. 
Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996) (age, religion, and 
retaliation); Ford v. Bernard Finesan Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (race, age, and gender); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 
(6th Cir. 1996) petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. 
Sept. 24, 1996) (No. 96-486) (age, gender, and retaliation); 
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Ser. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th 
Cir. 1996), (age and gender); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass 
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. 
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1996) (No. 96-337) (gender 
and disability); Americanos v. Carter,  74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1853 (1996) (age, gender, and 
national origin); Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(age, gender, and national origin); Meinecke v. 
H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77 (5th Cir. 1995) (age and gender); Johnson 
v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 35 F.3d 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (gender and religion); Dashnaw v. Pena, 12 F.3d 1112, 
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 417 (1994) (age, 
national origin, religion, and race); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 3 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1993) (age and gender).   
         To take one of the many possible combinations of 
claims, an employee might contend that he or she did not get a 
promotion (1) because of gender and (2) because of disability.  
If the record in such a case contains strong evidence of 
disability discrimination, rejection of the employer's 
explanation (let us say, inferior qualifications) will not by 
itself permit a strong inference that the employer's true reason 
was gender discrimination. 
         The degree to which a trier of fact can reasonably 
conclude that there was discrimination on the ground claimed by 
the plaintiff also depends upon the degree to which the trier of 
fact can reasonably reject the employer's reason(s).  (It is 
important to bear in mind that acceptance or rejection of an 
employer's reasons need not be an all-or-nothing proposition.)  
The evidence in a particular case may be such as to justify only 
a marginal or partial disbelief or belief of the employer's 
reason(s).  For example, a trier of fact might be justified in 
believing that it is more probable than not (but barely so) that 
the employer's explanation is false.  Or, a trier of fact might 
be justified in believing that it is more probable than not (but 
barely so) that the employer's explanation is true.  In addition, 
a trier of fact might be justified in believing that the reason 
asserted by the employer was not the sole cause but was a partial 
cause (say a 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80% cause) for the challenged 
action.  Or, if the employer asserts multiple reasons, the 
evidence might be such as to justify belief (to some degree) of 
some reasons but not others.  All other things being equal, the 
more strongly and completely the trier of fact can rationally 
rule out the employer's reason(s), the more justified it is to 
conclude that there was discrimination on the ground alleged -- 
and vice versa. 
         C.  Third, disbelief of the employer's explanation may 
also give rise to an inference that the employer was trying to 
conceal discrimination on the ground that the plaintiff claims.  
But the strength of this inference, too, will vary based on the 
facts.  Its strength will depend on whether there is evidence in 
the record of some other possible explanation that the employer 
might not want to disclose (e.g., in my prior hypothetical, 
disability discrimination).  In addition, its strength will 
obviously be proportional to the extent and strength of the trier 
of fact's disbelief of the employer's reason(s). 
         D.  The fourth category consists of any other relevant 
evidence of discrimination on the ground asserted.  "[S]tray 
remarks in the workplace" that are insufficient to make out a 
Price Waterhouse case are an example.  See Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
When evidence falling into this category is present, it should 
always be taken into account in determining whether a defense 
motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law should 
be granted -- something that the Fuentes test does not 
accomplish, as I will show below.  See infra at 28-29.  But of 
course, many McDonnell Douglas cases lack evidence of this sort.  
          
                                VI. 
 
         Having surveyed the types of evidence of discrimination 
that are relevant for present purposes, I return to the question 
whether there will always be enough evidence to support a verdict 
of discrimination on the ground alleged by the plaintiff after 
the McDonnell Douglas presumption has burst and sufficient 
evidence of pretext has been adduced.  To ensure that I am not 
misunderstood, I emphasize again that I think that under these 
circumstances there will usually be sufficient evidence -- but 
not always.  Specifically, where the natural probative force of 
the facts offered to prove the prima facie case is weak, where 
there is strong evidence in the record that the challenged 
employment action was attributable to some factor other than the 
discriminatory ground alleged by the plaintiff or the explanation 
offered by the employer, and where there is no other evidence 
that the action was due to discrimination on the ground alleged, 
the evidence of discrimination on that ground may be insufficient 
to sustain a verdict and thus insufficient to defeat summary 
judgment or judgment as a matter of law. 
         Here is an example.  A man with a disability applies 
for a promotion, but the promotion is given to a woman without a 
disability.  See, e.g., Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291 (3d Cir. 
1996)(man who was denied promotion sued for gender and disability 
discrimination).  The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
gender discrimination by showing that he is a man, he was 
qualified for the job, he applied, but it was given to a woman.  
There is no other evidence of gender discrimination against men; 
indeed, there is evidence that the decisionmaker was a man and 
that the great majority of the employees in the job category at 
issue were men.  The employer says that the woman was chosen 
because her qualifications were better, but the plaintiff shows 
that this explanation is full of holes.  In addition and most 
important, there is strong, direct evidence that the 
decisionmaker was biased against the plaintiff because of his 
disability.  Among other things, there is testimony that, when 
the decisionmaker learned that the plaintiff had applied for the 
promotion, the decisionmaker made insulting and derogatory 
remarks about the plaintiff's disability.   
         Is there enough evidence in this case to convince a 
rational trier of fact that the promotion decision was based on 
gender discrimination?  I think not, and if I am right, then the 
majority's blanket test is disproven.  Consider the evidence in 
each of the four categories that I previously described.  The 
facts underlying the prima facie case of gender discrimination -- 
basically that the plaintiff was qualified but a woman was given 
the job instead -- have little natural probative force for the 
purpose of showing gender discrimination; a qualified man might 
be rejected in favor of a woman for many other reasons.  As for 
the evidence that the employer's explanation (the woman's 
supposedly better qualifications) was untrue, ruling out the 
employer's explanation still leaves both gender and disability 
discrimination as possible explanations, and in light of the 
strong evidence of disability discrimination, does little to show 
gender discrimination.  Likewise, while the employer's conduct in 
proffering a false explanation permits an inference that the 
employer's real reason was one that it wished to hide, that 
inference does little to show that the employer's real reason was 
gender discrimination because there is strong evidence of another 
explanation (disability discrimination) that the employer would 
also have a motive to conceal.  Therefore, I submit that the 
evidence in this hypothetical case is insufficient to support a 
reasonable finding of gender discrimination and that that theory 
should be weeded from the case before the plaintiff's claim of 
disability discrimination is sent to the trier of fact. 
         The majority's test, however, would require that the 
gender discrimination claim be sent to the trier of fact as well.  
Indeed, if the plaintiff had added claims of age, race, national 
origin, and religious discrimination and was able to do the 
minimum necessary to establish a prima facie case on all of those 
grounds, all of those claims would have to be sent to the trier 
of fact as well.  I do not think that such results can be squared 
with the cardinal rules that the plaintiff in a discriminatory 
treatment case must prove intentional discrimination on each 
ground alleged and that summary judgment or judgment as a matter 
of law must be granted if the record does not rationally support 
a judgment for the non-moving part on each such ground.  See, 
e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:  Disparate Treatment 
After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2306-2311 (1995).  
 
 
                               VII.     
         Recognition of what I believe is the correct test would 
clarify the analysis of discriminatory-treatment cases and would 
avoid analytical difficulties that the majority's test creates.  
I will discuss two of these difficulties here.    
         A.  The first concerns cases in which the employer 
offers a multi-part explanation for the challenged action.  The 
Fuentes opinion, which the majority follows, first states that, 
when an employer asserts that the challenged action was taken for 
several reasons, the evidence "must allow a factfinder reasonably 
to infer that each of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory 
reasons . . . was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did 
not actually motivate the employment action . . . ."   32 F.3d at 
764 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  However, Fuentesqualifies 
this statement by adding that "[i]f the defendant 
proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the plaintiff 
manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of them, the 
plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder."  Id. at 764 
n.7 (emphasis added). 
         I am not sure what these rules mean.  What is the 
difference between "several reasons" and "a bagful"?  What is a 
"fair number" of a "bagful"?  If the employer offers three 
reasons, each of which, it says, was equally important in the 
challenged decision, how many must the plaintiff knock down?  All 
of them?  Or will two suffice?  (I assume that one would not be a 
"fair number.")  What if the employer says that reason one was 
the most important, counting for, say, 40%, and that reasons two 
and three each counted for 30%?  Would it be enough for the 
plaintiff to refute reason one?  If so, would refuting reason two 
by itself also suffice?  Why?  I don't know, and I don't think 
that it is possible to provide a satisfactory answer to questions 
of this sort within the framework of the majority's test. 
         By contrast, these problems disappear if what I contend 
is the correct test is used.  No matter how many reasons the 
employer offers and no matter what combination of reasons the 
plaintiff succeeds in knocking down, the dispositive question 
remains the same: taking into account all of the evidence in the 
record, including whatever inferences and deductions can 
rationally be drawn from the rejection of some (or all) of the 
employer's proffered reasons, is there enough proof to permit a 
rational trier of fact to find that intentional discrimination on 
the ground alleged was a determinative cause of the challenged 
action?    
         B.  The second analytical difficulty concerns the 
ability of a plaintiff to survive summary judgment or judgment as 
a matter of law by combining the evidence that necessarily 
remains after the McDonnell Douglas presumption has burst and 
sufficient evidence of pretext has been offered (the facts 
underlying the prima facie case and the inferences that logically 
flow from the rejection of the employer's explanation) with any 
other direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination that 
the plaintiff may be able to find.  Under Fuentes, a plaintiff 
may defeat summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law by 
"either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either 
circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether 
circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse 
employment action."  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (emphasis in 
original). 
         Why can't a plaintiff potentially satisfy his or her 
burden by combining some evidence from each of these categories?  
For example, if a plaintiff can almost, but not quite, show 
enough "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
legitimate reasons" to come within the first part of this test, 
id. at 765, why can't the plaintiff make it over the hump by 
adding a bit of evidence from the second part, i.e., other direct 
or circumstantial evidence of discrimination?  Fuentes doesn't 
explain, and I don't think that any good explanation is possible.  
               In sum, I submit that the majority's 
test is both wrong and unwieldy and that the correct test is 
simply whether a rational trier of fact could find, based on the 
record, that discrimination on the ground alleged was a 
determinative cause of the challenged employment action.   
 
                              VIII. 
 
         Applying this test, I agree with the district judge's 
analysis of the record.  The record shows great personal friction 
between the plaintiff and her supervisors regarding matters such 
as grooming, smoking, tardiness, and giving away free food and 
beverages, but the district judge saw little if any evidence of 
any kind that could reasonably link this personal animosity to 
the plaintiff's gender.  The district judge wrote that she was 
"left searching the record for evidence that gender played a 
determinative role in defendant's conduct."   
         In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority 
apparently relies on the following: (a) "no woman had ever held 
the position of Manager of Restaurants," (b) "a man replaced 
Sheridan as Head Captain of the Green Room morning shift," (c) 
"Amblard had told Sheridan he would watch her like a `hawk' and a 
`dog'," and (d) Amblard "ignor[ed] her and [spoke] instead to one 
of her male supervisors if one was present."  Maj. Op. 7.  But 
factor (a) gives rise to only a weak inference of gender 
discrimination because the plaintiff was found to be unqualified 
for the position of Manager of Restaurants.  Factor (b) likewise 
gives rise to only a weak inference since two of the other four 
head captains were women.  Factor (c) does not provide a link to 
gender; nor does factor (d).  Is all of this evidence taken 
together enough to persuade a rational factfinder that the reason 
for the animosity between the plaintiff and her supervisors was 
gender rather than sheer personal antipathy?  The district judge 
concluded that it was not, and I am inclined to agree with her 
analysis.   
         I also agree with the district judge's conditional 
grant of a new trial.  The district judge applied the correct 
legal standard.  She recognized that "[a] new trial cannot be 
granted . . . merely because the court would have weighed the 
evidence differently and reached a different conclusion."  
Sheridan II at 12 (quoting Markovich v. Bell Helicopter Textron,Inc., 805 
F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 977 F.2d 568 (3d 
Cir. 1992)).  Instead, the court stated, a new trial may be 
granted on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence only when the failure to do so would result in 
injustice or shock the conscience of the court.  Id.  Moreover, 
in assessing the evidence, the court recognized that disbelief of 
defendant's proffered reason was evidence of discrimination.  
Accordingly, I believe that the district judge applied the 
correct legal precepts in ruling on defendant's new trial motion, 
and because I do not think that she abused her discretion in 
granting the motion, I would affirm. 
 
 
